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Abstract
Vietnam is in transition in terms of economic development. Its economic sectors have seen 
incredible growth for decades, including agriculture. Vietnam’s rice sector has increasingly 
expanded for decades regarding production and exports, while the country has experienced 
structural adjustment and policy reform, such as land reform. This article examines the 
production and trade effect of policy reform on the rice sector in Vietnam from 1976 to 2014. 
Using ordinary least squares model and marginal effects, the study found that policy reform 
has a positive effect on rice production and exports in Vietnam. Moreover, it was found that 
the Doi Moi macroeconomic reform has had a strong and positive effect on rice exports. This 
result shows that policy transition contributes to an increase in rice production and exports.
Key words: land reform, Doi Moi, rice production, rice exports, Vietnam.
Introduction
Vietnam is one of the emerging markets that is in a transitional period. Its economy has gradually 
grown for decades. Its gross domestic product (GDP) has increased at 6 percent on average since 
1990 (World Bank, 2017), and its economic structure has shifted from an agricultural-based to a 
manufacturing-based economy. In 2015, manufacturing represented approximately 33 percent of 
its GDP, while agriculture was approximately 16 percent of its GDP (World Bank, 2017). Not only 
has its economy transitioned, but Vietnam has also shifted its policy to be more liberal since 
the late 1980s. Since the implementation of the Doi Moi, Vietnam has initiated a series of policy 
shifts, including structural adjustment, abandonment of tax barriers, and exposure to free trade 
agreements, and this series of policy shifts has contributed to the country’s economic growth, 
including the rice sector. Although Vietnam’s economy has relied less upon agriculture, it has 
become one of the top 25 largest food exporters in the world (Worldatlas, 2017). Agriculture is 
significant to Vietnam’s economy, and rice is the most significant agricultural commodity for 
Vietnam in terms of exports. According to Vietnam’s real GDP in 2017, the agricultural sector 
was the third largest economic sector in Vietnam. Its GDP (214,853 billion VND) was only smaller 
than the manufacturing (243,971 billion VND) and service (522,339 billion VND) sectors (Trading 
Economics, 2017). Rice exports were approximately 40 percent out of Vietnam’s total agricultural 
exports. The country has been one of the top rice exporters in the world for decades and has 
transformed itself from a rice-importing to a rice-exporting country. 
Scholars have indicated a close association between the growth of the agricultural market and 
policy reform, especially policy liberalization (Anderson & Martin, 2009; Laiprakobsup, 2014b). 
Nonetheless, previous work has usually focused on examining the association between policy 
reform (especially market liberalization) and agricultural growth in more open political contexts. 
Examination of the impact of policy reform on the growth of the agricultural market in emerging 
markets with close political regimes such as that in Vietnam has received some attention (Griffin, 
2016; Lawry et al., 2017). Unfortunately, scholars did not systematically examine the direct effect 
of policy reform on agricultural productivity, production, and exports. This paper examines the 
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impact of policy reform on the agricultural sector, especially the rice sector, in Vietnam. It argues 
that policy reform (i.e., land reform) has had a positive impact on rice production and exports in 
Vietnam. Since the government has decided to distribute land tenure rights to farmers, farmers now 
have an incentive to increase their productivity, which contributes to an increase in the country’s 
rice production and exports. Ordinary least squares and marginal effects models are employed to 
examine the effects of macroeconomic policy reforms on agricultural productivity, production, 
and exports. This paper is organized as follows. The second section reviews the literature on policy 
reform, especially regarding market reform and growth in agricultural policy shifts in developing 
countries. The third section then reviews the rice policy, rice production, and exports in Vietnam. 
The fourth section explains the data, the variables, and the method used in this paper. The fifth 
section represents the findings, while the sixth section discusses and concludes the paper.
Policy reform and growth of agricultural production and market
The agricultural market and production in developing countries have increasingly grown, and the 
growth of the agricultural market in these countries has occurred in the midst of agricultural policy 
shifts. Scholars have indicated that the government in several developing countries has shifted its 
policies from imposing all forms of taxes to abandoning tax barriers (Anderson & Martin, 2009; 
Laiprakobsup, 2014b). The policy shift in agriculture is due in part to the macroeconomic policy 
reform in developing countries. First, developing countries have decided to structurally adjust 
their market system by reducing tariffs on exportable commodities (Anderson, 2009). Second, the 
governments have abandoned the commodity price control of the domestic market, and have 
relied more on a market price system (Anderson & Martin, 2009). Third, they have abandoned 
foreign exchange control on exportable commodities so that producers are able to sell their 
commodities in accordance with market prices. For instance, Thailand and Malaysia have not 
imposed foreign exchange control on agricultural export commodities since 1997 (Siamwalla & 
Setboonsarng, 1991; Athukorala & Loke, 2009). A series of reforms have given incentive to domestic 
producers and foreign investors to increasingly produce and invest more in the market. The 
agricultural market in developing countries is positively affected by macroeconomic policy reform. 
The abandonment of tax barriers and controls regarding exportable agricultural commodities has 
encouraged the growth of agricultural exports in developing countries. Exporters are encouraged 
to export more commodities to new markets because fewer taxes are imposed on them by the 
government. Further, the abandonment of agricultural price control has encouraged the growth 
of agricultural production in developing countries – farmers and producers are encouraged to 
produce more commodities because they are able to sell their commodities at the market price. 
Examining the trade impact of the abandonment of rice export tax and other trade restrictions in 
Thailand, Laiprakobsup (2012) finds that the abandonment contributes to the growth of Thai rice 
exports by 236,593.08 metric tons in the first month after the abandonment.
Previous research indicated a close association between agricultural policy reform and an 
agricultural market shift in developing countries. Gulati and Pursell (2008), for example, indicated 
that agricultural production and exports have increasingly grown since governments decided to 
pursue market reform and trade liberalization in the 1990s in India. Lopes et al. (2008) pointed out 
the positive association between trade reform in the 2000s and the growth of agricultural exports 
in Brazil. Having studied the effect of trade openness in Southeast Asian countries, Laiprakobsup 
(2014b) argued that trade openness pursued by governments has contributed to the liberalization 
of the agricultural market and the growth of the agricultural market in Southeast Asia.
Scholars usually concentrated on countries whose political regimes were in transition to 
democracy and more open political regimes, such as Indonesia and the Philippines (Laiprakobsup, 
2014a). However, agricultural policy reform has also occurred in politically restricted countries. 
Authoritarian governments in some developing countries have pursued agricultural policy reform, 
such as the abandonment of tax barriers and land tenure, and these policy reforms were initiated 
by a dominating political party. Vietnam is an example of a developing country whose political 
regime is authoritarian, and the regime has initiated policy reform. More importantly, the rice 
market has grown during the 1990s-2000s (i.e. policy reform) (Athukorala et al., 2009). Figure 1 
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illustrates that Vietnam’s food and rice exports have steadily grown since 1986. Policy reform 
(i.e., land reform and structural adjustment) encourages producers and exporters to increase their 
productivity and exports since the government abandons restrictions and barriers that previously 
discouraged them from producing and exporting. Three main hypotheses are made to examine 
whether policy reform is positively associated with the growth of the rice market in Vietnam.
H
1
: The effectiveness of land reform leads to the growth of paddy rice productivity. 
H
2
: The effectiveness of land reform leads to the growth of milled rice production.
H
3
: The effectiveness of structural adjustment leads to the growth of the rice exports in Vietnam.
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Figure 1: Trend of rice export
Source: FAO 2017
Rice policy, rice production, and rice exports in Vietnam    
After the Vietnam War, Vietnam’s rice policy can be divided into three periods. The first period 
(1977-1987) was the government control period, where the economy was centrally planned 
by the Vietnamese Communist Party (Gavagnin et al., 2016). The government imposed several 
types of policy restrictions on the rice market. Having been influenced by socialist ideology, the 
government strictly controlled rice production and exports. Concerning rice production, the rice 
farmers were allowed by the government to harvest, but they were not given land tenure or the 
rights to farmland. Due to the collectivist policy, farmers were only allowed to sell their rice to 
the government, not to the market. In other words, farmers did not have private property rights 
to land or to their commodity. Regarding rice prices, the government strictly controlled the paddy 
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rice price (i.e., farm-gate price) in order to lower the price of rice in the domestic market for 
consumers. The government imposed a high protective tariff on imported commodities in order to 
protect state enterprises and domestic industries. It imposed several types of taxes and premiums 
on rice exports in order to accrue foreign exchange and revenue from the rice sector (Athukorala 
et al., 2009). Farmers were affected by the government’s policy in that they did not have incentive 
to increase or develop their productivity. 
However, in the early 1980s there was a sign of policy reform initiated by the government. In 1981, 
the government implemented the “output contract system,” which allowed farmers to keep their 
remaining production and sell it to the market after delivering the agreed production quota to the 
government (Gavagnin et al., 2016). Moreover, the program led to the allocation of plots of land to 
individual farmers and production delivery quotas, based on the average yield over previous years 
(Giesecke, Tran, Corong, & Jaffee, 2013; Gavagnin et al., 2016) 
The second period (1988-2000) was the beginning of the market reform period. After the 
government declared the Doi Moi in 1988, it continuously generated and implemented a series of 
policy reforms in the rice market. First, the government implemented a land reform policy in the 
mid and late 1990s, and it began to implement the Land Law policy in 1993, which gave land rights 
to farmers for 20 years (Marsh & MacAulay, 2006; OECD, 2015). Then, the government revised the 
law in 1998, 2001, and 2003. The new Land Law gave land tenure to farmers, and allowed farmers 
to exchange, sell, lease, mortgage, and inherit land (Gavagnin et al., 2016; Marsh & MacAulay, 
2006; OECD, 2015). Second, the government established a government assistance fund in order to 
provide loans and subsidies for rice farmers (OECD, 2015). One of the most important policies was 
the decision to recognize the family as the basic unit of agricultural development (Gavagnin et 
al., 2016; Menon, Rodgers, & Kennedy, 2017). The farmers were allowed to own their production. 
In 1993, the government generated loans and credits for farmers’ families. Third, the government 
relaxed taxation and the quota restrictions on rice exports by reducing the tax rate on rice exports 
and giving larger rice export quotas to private companies (OECD, 2015). Moreover, the government 
began to use a price support policy in order to support the price of paddy rice and to increase 
farmers’ income and encourage them to maintain their productivity. 
Nonetheless, the government retained some restriction of the rice market in this period. First, 
the government established a Price Stabilization Fund in order to control the prices of important 
commodities such as rice and coffee (OECD, 2015). Second, it established state enterprises (i.e., 
VINAFOOD I and II) for controlling the export of agricultural commodities, especially rice, in 1995. 
They were VINAFOOD I (located in Hanoi) and II (located in Ho Chi Minh City). Having been 
authorized to export rice, private companies had to be members of VINAFOOD I or II. In other 
words, rice exports were controlled by the government.
The third period (2001-present) was the internationalization and liberalization of the rice market. 
Due to its commitment to the international trade agreement regarding trade liberalization (WTO 
and ASEAN), the government increasingly abandoned export taxes and export quotas on rice, and 
it structurally reformed the state enterprises in that it decreased its shares in VINAFOOD I and 
II. In 2016, the government decided to reduce its shares in VINAFOOD II to 51 percent (Vietnam 
Investment Review, 2013). This decision encouraged private enterprises to become the owners of 
state-owned companies. Moreover, the role of VINAFOOD in rice exports seemed to decline. In 
2012, the percentage share of Vietnam’s rice exports was 34 percent of total rice exports. 
However, the government’s policy of industrialization negatively affected agriculture (Thanh et al., 
2015). The country’s economy increasingly relied on manufacturing exports, and the government 
wanted to transition to an industrialized economy. The exposure to the international market led 
Vietnam to transform agricultural land to factories, industrial parks, and urban cities (Gavagnin et 
al., 2016), and this transformation aggravated the conflict between the state and farmers. 
The rice situation in a comparative perspective
The rice productivity of Vietnam has increased since 1970. In 1970, the average rice yield was about 
21,534 kilograms per hectare while the average rice yield in 2015 was 57,200 kilograms per hectare 
(FAO, 2017). Compared to Thailand, Vietnam’s productivity was better than its counterpart. Figure 
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1 illustrates that, on average, Vietnam’s rice productivity in 2015 was about 60,000 kilograms per 
hectare, while Thailand’s rice productivity was only about 28,000 kilograms per hectare. The figure 
shows that Vietnam was able to increase its rice productivity, while Thailand struggled to increase 
its productivity. 
20
00
0
30
00
0
40
00
0
50
00
0
60
00
0
Y
ie
ld
 (k
ilo
gr
am
s 
pe
r h
ec
ta
re
)
1970 1977 1984 1991 1998 2005 2012
Year
Yield THAIYIELD
Figure 2: Comparison of rice yield of Vietnam and Thailand, 1970-2015
Source: FAO 2017
Regarding the production of rice, Vietnam has increased its production for several decades. In 1970, 
its production was about 10 million tons, while its production increased to 44 million tons in 2014. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Vietnam struggled to increase its production to more than 15 million 
tons. However, it was able to increase its production to more than 20 million tons in 1992 (4 years 
after the Doi Moi). Compared to Thailand, Vietnam produced rice more than its competitor. Figure 
2 shows that in 2014 Vietnam’s rice production was about 44 million tons, while Thailand’s rice 
production was about 10 million tons in 2013. This indicates that Vietnam was able to increase its 
rice production, while Thailand struggled to increase its production during these years.
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Figure 3: Comparison of rice production of Vietnam and Thailand, 1970-2014
Source: FAO 2017
Vietnam’s rice exports have gradually increased since 1970. Vietnam exported only about 18,000 
tons then, while it exported about 6 million tons. From the 1970s to 1980s, Vietnam exported only 
100,000 tons. The turning point was 1989 (1 year after the Doi Moi), when Vietnam first exported 
more than 1 million tons. It has exported more than 1 million tons since then. This shows a sharp 
increase in rice exports of Vietnam over the last four decades. In 1970, Thailand exported over 1 
million tons of rice to the world market. In 2014, Thailand exported more than 9 million tons, 
while Vietnam exported more than 6 million tons.
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Figure 4: Comparison of rice exports of Vietnam and Thailand, 1970-20144
Source: FAO 2017
Data, variables, and methods 
Three dependent variables were used to measure the rice production and exports in Vietnam. The 
first dependent variable was the log average yield of paddy rice from 1970 to 2015. It measured the 
average yield of paddy rice of Vietnam in each year (FAO, 2017). The second dependent variable 
was the log average of milled rice production from 1970 to 2015. It measured Vietnam’s milled rice 
production on average in each year (FAO, 2017). The third dependent variable was the log average 
of rice exports of Vietnam from 1970 to 2015. It measured Vietnam’s rice exports on average in 
each year (FAO, 2017). Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables. On 
average, Vietnam’s rice yield was 35,911 kilograms per hectare, while Vietnam’s rice production 
was 23.90 million tons. Vietnam exported 2.37 million tons, on average.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of Vietnam’s rice productivity, production, and exports
Dependent 
Variables Observation Mean
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Yield 46 35911.09 12675.65 17922 57538
Production1 45 23.90 11.61 9.79 44.97
Export2 46 2.37 2.44 0.002 8.01
Note: 1. Unit is million tons; 2. Unit is million tons
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Independent and control variables
Three independent variables were employed to measure land and policy reform. To operationalize 
and test the first and second hypothesis, two dummy variables were employed to measure the 
effect of land reform on rice productivity and production in Vietnam. The Vietnamese government 
implemented land distribution and rights for 20 years in 1993 (Marsh & MacAulay, 2006). Then, the 
government revised the law in 1998 (Marsh & MacAulay, 2006). Therefore, the effectiveness of land 
reform took place in 1993 and 1998. We created two dummy variables to capture the effectiveness 
of land reform. The first variable was LLI, capturing the effectiveness of land reform since 1993, 
while the second variable was RLL, capturing the effectiveness of land reform since 1998 (Marsh & 
MacAulay, 2006). We put 1 for the year that the government effectively implemented land reform. 
Otherwise, we put 0. A positive association between LLI and rice yield and production was expected. 
Similarly, a positive association between RLL and rice yield and production was expected. 
In order to operationalize and test the third hypothesis, one dummy variable was employed to 
measure the effect of policy reform on rice exports in Vietnam. The Doi Moi is considered the 
beginning of policy reform of Vietnam and was first initiated in 1988 in order to pursue market 
liberalization (Athukorala et al., 2009). Since then, the government has continuously pursued a 
series of market liberalizations, such as the abandonment of protective tariffs, state control over 
the domestic market, and the structural reform of state-owned enterprises. We created a dummy 
variable, namely DoiMoi, to capture its effectiveness since 1988. We put 1 for the year that the 
government effectively implemented the Doi Moi. Otherwise, we put 0. A positive association 
between the Doi Moi and rice exports was expected.  
Rice production and exports can be affected by a government’s policies. To control for the effect 
of policy factors, the government’s decision to subsidize (or tax) the rice sector was included. 
When a government subsidizes the rice sector, farmers have more incentive to increase their 
productivity. However, when it heavily taxes farmers, they are discouraged from increasing their 
productivity since the more they harvest, the more tax burdens they have to bear. The nominal 
rate of assistance (NRA) to the rice sector was employed to capture the government’s decision to 
subsidize (or tax) this sector (Anderson, 2009). As Laiprakobsup (2014a, p. 8) explained the NRA, “It 
measures the extent to which the government sets the domestic producer price above (or below) 
the border (i.e., export) price (Anderson & Martin, 2009). The positive NRA percentage indicates 
that the government is likely to transfer revenues to the producers. In other words, the positive 
percentage implies that the government subsidizes the agricultural commodity sector in year t.” 
On average, the NRA for the rice sector was -1.68, which indicates that Vietnam still had imposed 
taxes on the rice sector during all these years. A positive association between the NRA and rice 
production and exports was expected.  
In addition, in order to control for the effect of policy factors, the government’s decision to 
subsidize (or tax) agriculture was included. Once a government heavily supports agriculture, 
farmers have more incentive to increase their productivity. However, when it heavily taxes farmers, 
they are discouraged from increasing their productivity. The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) to 
agriculture was employed to the capture government’s decision to subsidize (or tax) agriculture 
(Anderson, 2009). Similar to the rice sector, the NRA for agriculture was -0.04, which indicated that 
Vietnam had still taxed agriculture during all these years. A positive association between NRA and 
rice production and export was expected.  
Subsidization of the non-agricultural sector could affect the growth of that sector. The 
government could accrue revenue from the rice sector and allocate revenue to other sectors. 
In developing countries, governments are likely to tax agriculture and transfer the tax revenue 
to other economic sectors, such as the manufacturing sector (Laiprakobsup, 2010; Varshney, 
1995). This means that farmers are more likely to be taxed. Due to a high level of taxes, they are 
discouraged from increasing their production, while exporters are discouraged from exporting 
more commodities. We used a nominal rate of assistance for the non-agricultural sectors in order 
to capture the government’s decision to subsidize (or tax) the non-agricultural sectors (Anderson, 
2009). On average, the nominal rate of assistance for non-agriculture was 0.05. This indicates that 
Vietnam was more likely to support non-agriculture sectors. A negative association between rice 
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production and exports and the NRA for non-agricultural sectors was expected.
In order to control for the effect of the political factor, political regime was included. Political 
liberalization leads to the growth of the agricultural market via abandoning tax barriers. Previous 
work has indicated that political regimes have had a positive impact on agriculture. Laiprakobsup 
(2014a, 2014b), for example, pointed out that democratic regimes are more likely to subsidize 
agriculture, while authoritarianism is more likely to tax agriculture. Elected politicians often 
promise farmers that they will reduce taxes and provide more government assistance (Olper & 
Raimondi, 2013). We used the Freedom House index to measure the political characteristics in 
Vietnam. This index ranges from 1 (the most free society) to 7 (the least free society). A negative 
association between the Freedom House index and rice production and exports was expected to 
be found. 
Table 2: Description and operationalization of variables and expected sign
Variables Description Operationalization Expected Results
LLI The effectiveness of land reform since 1993
Dummy
0 = Ineffectiveness
1 = Effectiveness
+
RLL The effectiveness of land reform since 1998
Dummy
0 = Ineffectiveness
1 = Effectiveness
+
DoiMoi 
The effectiveness of 
macroeconomic reform since 
1988
Dummy
0 = Ineffectiveness
1 = Effectiveness
+
Nrarice The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) to the rice sector
Nominal Index (See 
Anderson, 2009) +
Nraagri The nominal rate of assistance (NRA) to the agricultural sector
Nominal Index (See 
Anderson, 2009) +
Nranonagri
The nominal rate of assistance 
(NRA) to the non-agricultural 
sector
Nominal Index (See 
Anderson, 2009) -
liberty Freedom of expression
The Freedom House Index
1 = most free
7= least free
-
Source: authors’ compilation
In examining the effects of the policy reform and other factors, ordinary least squares (OLS) was 
employed. Misspecification tests were used to examine the validity of the statistical inferences. 
The tests were heteroskedasticity (White, 1980), the Ramsey RESET for omitted variables (Ramsey, 
1969), the variance inflation factor for multicollinearity, the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for serial 
correlation (Breusch, 1978; Goffrey, 1978), and the Durbin-Watson for autocorrelation (Durbin & 
Watson, 1950). Moreover, we used Akaike’s information criterion (Akaike, 1973) and the Bayesian 
information criterion (Schwarz, 1978) to measure which model performed better in terms of 
predicting the effect of policy reform on rice production and exports. Models 1, 2, and 3 examined 
the effect of policy reform on the rice yield in Vietnam. Models 4, 5, and 6 examined the effect of 
policy reform on the rice production in Vietnam, and Model 7 and 8 examined the effect of policy 
reform on the rice exports in Vietnam.
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Results
Policy reform and rice productivity
Table 2 shows the statistical results from models 1, 2, and 3. All of the models performed very well 
in terms of predicting the effect of policy reform on rice productivity. The joint F-statistics were 
statistically significant at p < 0.01, which indicates that the explanatory variables jointly had a 
significant impact on the rice yield of Vietnam. The joint F-statistics were statistically significant 
at p < 0.01, which indicates that the explanatory variables jointly had a significant impact on rice 
productivity. The adjusted R2 statistics indicated that all of the models were able to predict the 
change in the dependent variable well. According to the AIC and BIC statistics, model 2 seemed to 
be the best model to explain the effect of all the explanatory variables on rice yield. 
As expected, the land and policy reform variables (i.e., LLI, RLL, and Doimoi) had a positive effect 
on rice yield. The LLI, RLL, and Doimoi variables were statistically significant at p < 0.05. Holding 
other factors constant, a unit increase in the LLI score was associated with the increase of 3,263.34, 
3,636.91, and 3,491.62 ton points of rice yield in Vietnam, respectively (see table A1 in the appendix). 
Meanwhile, holding other factors constant, a unit increase in the RLL score was associated with 
the increase of 3,076.88, 3,575.84, and 3,289.31 kilogram points of rice yield in Vietnam, respectively 
(see table A1 in the appendix). The effectiveness of the Doi Moi had a positive impact on rice 
productivity in Vietnam. Holding other factors constant, a unit increase in the Doimoi score was 
associated with the increase of 3,276.57, 3,086.46, and 3,172.68 ton points of rice yield in Vietnam, 
respectively (see table A1 in the appendix). 
Table 3: Effect of land and policy reform on rice productivity in Vietnam (Dependent variable = rice 
yield (natural log))
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
LLI 0.109**(0.038)
0.11***
(0.033)
0.112**
(0.389)
RLL 0.086**(0.04)
0.097**
(0.039)
0.091**
(0.038)
Thai yield (log) 0.472(0.286)
0.412*
(0.22)
0.424
(0.291)
Nraagri -0.037(0.102)
Nranonagri -0.078(0.02)
Nrarice -000(0.001)
Liberty -0.063(0.050)
-0.073***
(0.023)
-0.061
(0.049)
Doimoi 0.119***(0.038)
0.111**
(0.039)
0.114**
(0.041)
Constant 5.972*(3.112)
6.653**
(2.310)
6.442*
(3.150)
N 20 24 19
Standard Error of 
Regression 0.621 0.960 0.541
Adjusted R2 0.942 0.961 0.938
F-Statistics 53.24*** 94.36*** 46.60***
Durbin-Watson 2.16 2.12 2.22
LM (χ2(1)) 2.003 2.928* 2.494
RESET 0.86 0.19 0.27
White (χ2(1)) 0.00 0.01 0.01
VIF 5.47 5.37 4.38
AIC -63.49 -79.99 -60.32
BIC -56.52 -71.74 -53.71
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors (S.E.). VIF 
stands for variance inflation for the independent factors. Briefly, if the value of the mean VIF is 
lower than 10, then the models are less likely to be affected by the multi-collinearity problem.
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The misspecification tests are shown in F-statistic terms. In model 1, the Lagrange multiplier (LM) 
first-order serial correlation was 2.003 (with a p-value of 0.18), while the Ramsay RESET result was 
0.86 (with a p-value of 0.49). White’s heteroskedasticity test result was 0.00 (with a p-value of 0.99). 
The result of the Variance Inflation for the Independent Factors (VIF) test was 5.47. In model 2, the 
LM statistics was 1.24 (with a p-value of 0.08), while the RESET result was 0.19 (with a p-value of 
0.90). White’s test result was 0.01 (with a p-value of 0.91), and the result of the VIF test was 5.37. In 
model 3, the LM statistics was 2.49 (with a p-value of 0.13), while the RESET result was 0.27 (with 
a p-value of 0.84). White’s test result was 0.01 (with a p-value of 0.90), and the result of the VIF test 
was 4.38. Even though the LM statistics in model 2 was significant at p < 0.10, the omitted variable 
problem weakly affected the model. The misspecification tests showed that none of the models 
was plagued by misspecification problems.
The marginal effects of land and policy reform on the rice productivity in Vietnam were calculated 
over the range of the other control factors in order to better understand the extent to which 
the land and policy reform affected the rice productivity in Vietnam. Table 3 indicates that the 
predicted size of the rice yield was likely to increase when land and policy reform was effectively 
implemented. All marginal-effects coefficients were statistically significant at p < 0.01. When a 
government initiated land reform and gave land tenure to rice farmers, productivity was more 
likely to increase.
Table 4: Marginal effects of land and policy reform on predicted rice productivity (Unit: kilograms 
per hectare)
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
LLI
0 = 35,503.93***
0.5 = 37,135.6***
1 = 38,767.27***
0 = 37,258.10***
0.5 = 39,076.56***
1 = 40,895.02***
0 = 34,826.91***
0.5 = 36,572.73***
1 = 38,318.55***
RLL
0 = 36,394.35***
0.5 = 37,923.79***
1 = 39,471.23***
0 = 38,046.33***
0.5 = 39,834.29***
1 = 41,622.17***
0 = 35,820.31***
0.5 = 37,464.96***
1 = 39,109.61***
Doimoi
0 = 34,676.18***
0.5 = 36,314.47***
1 = 37,952.76***
0 = 37,004.99***
0.5 = 38,548.22***
1 = 40,091.46***
0 = 34,193.44***
0.5 = 35,799.78***
1 = 37,366.12***
Note: *** p < 0.01. Coefficients are marginal effects coefficients. 0 = Policy reform is not effective; 
0.5 = Policy reform is partly effective; 1 = Policy reform is fully effective.
Policy reform and rice production
Table 4 shows the statistical results for models 4, 5, and 6. All of the models performed very well 
in terms of predicting the effect of policy reform on rice productivity. The joint F-statistics were 
statistically significant at p < 0.01, which indicates that the explanatory variables jointly had a 
significant impact on the rice yield of Vietnam. The joint F-statistics were statistically significant 
at p < 0.01, which indicates that the explanatory variables jointly had a significant impact on rice 
production. The adjusted R2 statistics indicated that all of the models were able to predict the 
change in the dependent variable well. According to the AIC and BIC statistics, model 5 seemed to 
be the best model to explain the effect of all explanatory variables on rice yield. 
As expected, the land and policy reform variables (i.e., LLI, RLL, and Doimoi) had a positive effect 
on rice production. The LLI, RLL, and Doimoi variables were statistically significant at p < 0.05. 
Holding other factors constant, a unit increase in the LLI score was associated with the increase 
of 5.46, 5.60, and 5.38 million ton points of rice production in Vietnam, respectively (see table 
A2 in the appendix). Meanwhile, holding other factors constant, a unit increase in the RLL score 
was associated with the increase of 5.26, 6.01, and 5.25 million ton points of rice production in 
Vietnam, respectively (see table A2 in the appendix). The effectiveness of the Doi Moi had a positive 
impact on rice productivity in Vietnam. Holding other factors constant, a unit increase in the 
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Doimoi score was associated with the increase of 3.51, 3.54, and 3.19 million ton points of rice 
production in Vietnam, respectively (see table A2 in the appendix). 
Table 5: Effect of land and policy reform on rice production in Vietnam (Dependent variable = rice 
production (natural log))
Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
LLI 0.248***(0.049)
0.245***
(0.046)
0.242***
(0.389)
RLL 0.190**(0.063)
0.220***
(0.061)
0.192**
(0.063)
Thai production (log) 0.176(0.157)
0.118
(0.131)
0.199
(0.157)
Nraagri -0.101(0.187)
Nranonagri -0.111(0.189)
Nrarice -001(0.001)
Liberty -0.096(0.055)
-0.072**
(0.033)
-0.087
(0.058)
Doimoi 0.201***(0.059)
0.189***
(0.062)
0.179**
(0.067)
Constant 16.95***(0.499)
16.898***
(0.383)
16.875***
(0.515)
N 20 24 19
Standard Error of 
Regression 1.531 2.073 1.395
Adjusted R2 0.939 0.952 0.935
F-Statistics 49.82*** 77.49*** 44.33***
Durbin-Watson 1.83 1.86 1.83
LM (χ2(1)) 1.582 2.427 1.620
RESET 0.37 1.10 0.40
White (χ2(1)) 0.57 0.48 0.23
VIF 3.70 4.07 3.21
AIC -44.19 -56.94 -41.41
BIC -37.22 -48.69 -34.80
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors (S.E.). VIF 
stands for variance inflation for the independent factors. Briefly, if the value of the mean VIF is 
lower than 10, then the models are less likely to be affected by the multi-collinearity problem.
The misspecification tests are shown in F-statistic terms. In model 4, the Lagrange multiplier (LM) 
first-order serial correlation was 1.582 (with a p-value of 0.25), while the Ramsay RESET result was 
0.37 (with a p-value of 0.77). White’s heteroskedasticity test result was 0.57 (with a p-value of 0.44). 
The result of the Variance Inflation for the Independent Factors (VIF) test was 3.70. In model 5, 
the LM statistics was 2.47 (with a p-value of 0.12), while the RESET result was 1.10 (with a p-value 
of 0.38). White’s test result was 0.48 (with a p-value of 0.48), and the result of the VIF test was 
4.07. In model 6, the LM statistics was 1.62 (with a p-value of 0.25), while the RESET result was 
0.40 (with a p-value of 0.76). White’s test result was 0.23 (with a p-value of 0.68), and the result of 
the VIF test was 3.21. The misspecification tests showed that none of the models was plagued by 
misspecification problems.
We also used the marginal effects to predict the effect of land and policy reform on rice production 
in Vietnam. Table 5 indicates that the predicted size of rice production was likely to increase 
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when land and policy reform was effectively implemented. All marginal-effects coefficients were 
statistically significant at p < 0.01. The more likely the reforms were to be fully effective, the 
more likely was the production to increase. When a government initiated land reform and gave 
land tenure to rice farmers, the production was more likely to increase. Similarly, Vietnam’s rice 
production had increased since the Doi Moi was effectively implemented.
Table 6: Marginal effects of land and policy reform on predicted rice productivity (Unit: million 
tons)
Independent Variables Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
LLI
0 = 22.40***
0.5 = 25.13***
1 = 27.86***
0 = 23.89***
0.5 = 26.69***
1 = 29.48***
0 = 34,826.91***
0.5 = 36,572.73***
1 = 38,318.55***
RLL
0 = 23.84***
0.5 = 26.47***
1 = 29.11***
0 = 24.85***
0.5 = 27.85***
1 = 30.86***
0 = 35,820.31***
0.5 = 37,464.96***
1 = 39,109.61***
Doimoi
0 = 22.79***
0.5 = 24.54***
1 = 26.30***
0 = 24.60***
0.5 = 26.38***
1 = 28.14***
0 = 34,193.44***
0.5 = 35,799.78***
1 = 37,366.12***
Note: *** p < 0.01. Coefficients are marginal effects coefficients. 0 = Policy reform is not effective; 
0.5 = Policy reform is partly effective; 1 = Policy reform is fully effective.
Policy reform and rice export
Table 6 shows the statistical results for models 7 and 8.1 All of the models performed very well in 
terms of predicting the effect of policy reform on rice export, even though the prediction power 
was not equal to that of models 1-6. The joint F-statistics were statistically significant at p < 0.01, 
which indicates that the explanatory variables jointly had a significant impact on the rice yield 
of Vietnam. The joint F-statistics were statistically significant at p < 0.01, which indicates that the 
explanatory variables jointly had a significant impact on rice exports. The adjusted R2 statistics 
indicated that all of the models were able to predict the change in the dependent variable well. 
According to the AIC and BIC statistics, model 7 seemed to be the best model to explain the effect 
of all explanatory variables on the rice yield. 
1      Unlike what we tested, the effect of policy and land reform on rice productivity and production, we decided to include 
the NRA for all agricultural sectors and the NRA for the rice sector in model 7 and 8. We decided to exclude the NRA from 
the non-agricultural sectors and the NRA for the rice sector. The main reason was that we faced misspecification problems 
(omitted variable and heteroskedasticity) when we ran the statistical models similar to what we did with rice productivity 
and production. In addition, we faced misspecification problems when we included the NRA for the non-agricultural sector 
and the NRA for the rice sector in the model. Therefore, we had to adjust the statistical models from what we did for rice 
productivity and rice production.
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Table 7: Effect of land and policy reform on rice export in Vietnam (Dependent variable = Rice 
export (natural log))
Variables Model 7 Model 8
LLI 1.344**(0.519)
RLL 0.975(0.738)
Thai export (log) 1.323(1.799)
0.896
(2.115)
Philippine import (log) -0.005(0.075)
0.029
(0.084)
Nraagri -1.618(1.88)
-1.026
(2.196)
Liberty -0.263(0.624)
0.067
(0.736)
Doimoi 1.797**(0.688)
2.201**
(0.785)
Constant -7.016(30.268)
-2.865
(0.786)
N 20 20
Standard Error of Regression 29.114 29.114
Adjusted R2 0.650 0.532
F-Statistics 6.88*** 4.61**
Durbin-Watson 1.88 1.72
LM (χ2(1)) 0.833 0.221
RESET 2.65 0.15
White (χ2(1)) 2.39 0.33
VIF 3.54 3.81
AIC 49.68 55.47
BIC 56.65 62.45
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors (S.E.). VIF 
stands for variance inflation for the independent factors. Briefly, if the value of the mean VIF is 
lower than 10, then the models are less likely to be affected by the multi-collinearity problem.
Table 6 indicates that the land reform in 1993 and the Doi Moi had a positive impact on rice 
exports in Vietnam, while the land reform in 1998 did not have significant impact on Vietnam’s rice 
exports. The LLI and Doimoi variables were associated with an increase in the rice export variable. 
The misspecification tests are shown in F-statistic terms. In model 7, the Lagrange multiplier (LM) 
first-order serial correlation was 0.83 (with a p-value of 0.46), while the Ramsay RESET result was 
2.65 (with a p-value of 0.92). White’s heteroskedasticity test result was 2.39 (with a p-value of 0.12). 
The result of the Variance Inflation for the Independent Factors (VIF) test was 3.54. In model 8, 
the LM statistics was 0.221 (with a p-value of 0.81), while the RESET result was 0.15 (with a p-value 
of 0.92). White’s test result was 0.33 (with a p-value of 0.57), and the result of the VIF test was 
4.07. In model 6, the LM statistics were 1.62 (with a p-value of 0.25), while the RESET result was 
0.40 (with a p-value of 0.76). White’s test result was 0.23 (with a p-value of 0.68), and the result of 
the VIF test was 3.81. The misspecification tests showed that none of the models was plagued by 
misspecification problems.
We also used the marginal effects to predict the effect of LLI and Doimoi on rice exports in Vietnam.2 
Table 7 indicates that the predicted size of rice exports was likely to increase when land and policy 
reform was effectively implemented. All marginal effects coefficients were statistically significant 
at p < 0.05. The more likely the reforms were to be fully effective, the more likely it was that exports 
would increase. Note that the Doimoi coefficients were increasingly significant. The variable was 
2      We did not test the RLL variable since it was not statistically significant.
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statistically significant at p < 0.05 when it was ineffective. However, it was statistically significant 
at p < 0.01 when it was fully effective. This indicated that the more likely the government was to 
fully implement the Doi Moi, the more likely the size of rice exports was to expand.
Table 8: Marginal effects of land and policy reform on predicted rice exports (Unit: million tons)
Independent Variables Model 7 Model 8
LLI
0 = 1.89***
0.5 = 2.37***
1 = 2.86***
N/A
Doimoi
0 = 1.74**
0.5 = 2.17***
1 = 2.61***
0 = 1.39**
0.5 = 2.02***
1 = 2.64***
Note: ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Coefficients are marginal effects coefficients. 0 = Policy reform is not 
effective; 0.5 = Policy reform is partly effective; 1 = Policy reform is fully effective. The result is not 
available because the LLI variable was not included in model 8.
Regarding the control variables, only the liberty variable significantly affected rice productivity 
and production in some circumstances. As expected, the liberty variable had a negative impact on 
rice yield and rice production, only when the NRA for the non-agriculture sectors was included 
(see models 2 and 5 in table 2 and 4). The more the government strictly controlled the political 
system, the less likely the productivity and production was to expand. The explanation was that 
once Vietnamese governments decided to strictly control politics, they probably slowed down 
every aspect of policy reform, including macroeconomic and land reforms.
Discussion and conclusion
Land and macroeconomic reforms in Vietnam, as discussed above, contribute to the growth of 
the agricultural market at every level. The reforms led to an increase in the rice productivity 
of farmers. The land reforms during the 1990s, which gave land tenure and rights to individual 
farmers, encouraged farmers to increase their productivity in that farmers knew that they were 
able to own, collect, and sell their commodities to the market. In other words, the governments 
decided not to intervene in farmers’ rights to their commodities. Once the governments did not 
heavily control the farmers, they were free to make decisions about their commodities. Table 8 
shows that the average yield grew gradually after the effectiveness of the Doi Moi (1988) and the 
land reforms in the 1990s. According to the table, the average rice yield of Vietnam grew by more 
than 30 percent, especially during the 1990s and 2000s. 
   
Table 9: Average rice yield of Vietnam, 1970-2015
Year Average Yield (Kilograms per hectare)
Average Growth (%) (from a 
previous decade)
1970-1979 21,095.60
1980-1989 (the Doi Moi) 26,607.70 26.13
1990-1999 (Land Reforms) 36,072 35.57
2000-2009 47,853.90 32.66
2010-2015 55,936.33 16.88
Source: authors’ calculations, based on FAO 2016
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Table 9 and 10 present the average rice production and rice exports every ten years. Table 9 
indicates that the average rice production grew increasingly, especially in the 1980s and the 1990s. 
The average Rice production in the 1990s was 62.30 percent higher than that in the 1980s, so the 
growth of rice exports was evident. The average rice exports in the 1970s were about 8,500 tons. 
By the end of the 1990s, the average rice exports in the 1980s were about 200,000 tons. In other 
words, the average rice exports in the 1980s were 2,252 percent higher than those in the 1970s. The 
rice exports in Vietnam in the 1990s kept growing; the average rice exports in the 1990s were 1,155 
percent higher than those in the 1980s. The Doi Moi and the land reform contributed to the growth 
of rice production and exports in Vietnam.  
Table 10: Average rice production of Vietnam, 1970-2015
Year Average Production (Million tons)
Average Growth (%) (from a 
previous decade)
1970-1979 10.74
1980-1989 (the Doi Moi) 15.17 41.25
1990-1999 (Land Reforms) 24.62 62.30
2000-2009 35.84 45.57
2010-2015 43.40 20.81
Source: authors’ calculations, based on FAO 2016
Table 11: Average rice yield of Vietnam, 1970-2015
Year Average Exports (Million tons) Average Growth (%) (from a previous decade)
1970-1979 0.0085
1980-1989 (the Doi Moi) 0.20 2,252
1990-1999 (Land Reforms) 2.51 1,155
2000-2009 4.35 73.31
2010-2015 6.38 46.67
Source: authors’ calculations, based on FAO 2016
The implementation of land reforms encouraged rice farmers to grow and harvest more rice 
because the government allowed them to collect, exchange, and sell their commodities to the 
market. They received much higher prices than they had during the 1970s. Private rice businesses 
were encouraged by the Doi Moi’s policy reform. Regarding the rice milling business, enormous 
amounts of paddy rice were transacted in the market since the collectivism policy was abandoned. 
Hence, rice millers had an incentive to develop their production and increase their milling capacity. 
The Doi Moi contributed to the technological upgrade of the rice production in Vietnam. Since 
the governments abandoned their protectionist policy, the import tax for agricultural machines 
was gradually reduced. Such a tax reduction encouraged private rice millers to import milling 
machines and technology from foreign countries. Moreover, the reduction of protective tariffs 
encouraged foreign investors to invest in the rice milling business in Vietnam. Having interviewed 
the former chairperson of the Thai Rice Miller Association, we found that foreign investors from 
Europe increasingly invested in the rice milling industry in Vietnam via importing milling machines 
to Vietnam. Foreign investors were encouraged to import rice milling machines and invest in 
rice milling houses because Vietnam had plenty of paddy rice at cheap prices in the market.3 
More importantly, the Vietnamese government supported foreign investment in the agricultural 
3      Interviewed on 11th October 2016.
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industry.4 Therefore, the continuity of policy reform led to the growth of agricultural production 
in Vietnam because it gave incentive for local and international rice businesses to invest in rice 
production there.
Figure 5: The Doi Moi and the growth of rice production in Vietnam
Source: author’s illustration
The Doi Moi contributed to the expansion of rice exports in Vietnam. Previously, governments 
heavily controlled rice exports via imposing high rates of export taxes and restricting the quantity 
of rice exports. Such tax barriers discouraged private rice exporters from expanding their market 
because the more they exported, the more they were taxed. Due to the implementation of the Doi 
Moi, the governments gradually abandoned the tax barriers and regulations. Thus, rice exporters 
had more incentive to export more rice to the international market since all kinds of tax and legal 
burdens were greatly reduced, and they had more incentive to find new international markets for 
rice. Figure 5 indicates that the implementation of the Doi Moi led to the expansion of Vietnam’s 
rice exports via an increase in the private rice exporters’ incentive.
Figure 6: The Doi Moi and the growth of rice exports in Vietnamm
Source: author’s illustration
To conclude, Vietnam’s rice market has increasingly grown and transformed for more than three 
decades. The growth of the rice market took place in the midst of the country’s policy shift, 
especially the land and macroeconomic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. This paper explains the 
association between land reform, structural adjustment, and the growth of the rice market in 
Vietnam. The main argument is that land and policy reforms lead to the growth of rice productivity, 
production, and exports in Vietnam. Since the Vietnamese government structurally adjusted the 
market in the late 1980s and distributed land tenure and rights in the 1990s, the rice farmers had 
incentive to increase and develop their rice productivity. As a consequence, rice production and 
exports increased due to these reforms. The statistical results showed that the land reform in 
1993 had a positive effect on rice yield, production, and exports, while the land reform in 1998 
had a positive effect on rice yield and production. The effectiveness of the Doi Moi (structural 
adjustment) in 1988 had a positive effect on the rice yield, production, and exports in Vietnam. 
4      The former chairperson even told us that rice milling technology in Vietnam was more advanced than that in Thailand. 
While the Vietnamese government reduced its control over the rice sector, the Thai government increasingly intervened in the 
rice sector via the rice pledging scheme.
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Generally, policy reform which aims to distribute resources to producers has become one of the 
significant conditions for encouraging agricultural market growth in developing countries. Once 
producers are given rights to their land and commodities, they have an incentive to increase and 
develop their productivity. The increase in farmers’ productivity is causally related to production 
and exports growth. In order to improve farmers’ conditions and increase their productivity, 
governments in developing countries formulate and implement policies which redistribute public 
resources to individual farmers and decrease governmental restrictions on farmers’ commodity 
rights. Market reform is also another key ingredient for agricultural market growth in developing 
countries. Previously, private businesses did not have an incentive to expand into the agricultural 
market because they were strictly controlled by taxes and government restrictions. Since 
governments have decided to abandon several types of restrictions, all tax and legal burdens were 
lifted. In a globalized and competitive market, governments should consider policy implementation 
that is able to improve farmers’ capacity of production and allow them to have rights to land, 
inputs, and commodities. The governments should consider policy implementation that facilitates 
and encourages private businesses to compete efficiently with competitors rather than restricting 
them with taxes and rules.
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Appendix
Table A1: Effect of land and policy reform on rice productivity in Vietnam (Dependent variable = 
rice yield (kilograms per hectare))
Variables Model A1 Model A2 Model A3
LLI 3263.34**(1459.07)
3636.91**
(1319.20)
3491.63**
(1450.50)
RLL 3076.88*(1499.33)
3575.84**
(1604.05)
3289.30**
(1470.97)
Thai yield (kilogram per 
hectare))
0.931*
(0.468)
0.695*
(0.36)
0.797
(0.48)
Nraagri -1438.29(3841.72)
Nranonagri -0.078(0.02)
Nrarice -13.02(31.86)
Liberty -2157.00(2082.44)
-3392.75***
(1010.91)
-2250.13
(2055.49)
Doimoi 3276.58**(1433.56)
3086.46*
(1567.65)
3172.68*
(1552.24)
Constant 23328(23029.99)
37306.62**
(13740.13)
26977.64
(22834.1)
N 20 24 19
Standard Error of 
Regression 1640.7 1645.1 1618.2
Adjusted R2 0.941 0.957 0.935
F-Statistics 51.38*** 87.06*** 44.50***
Durbin-Watson 2.03 1.94 2.10
LM (χ2(1)) 1.63 3.20* 2.30
RESET 1.10 0.23 0.45
White (χ2(1)) 0.64 1.58 0.87
VIF 5.90 5.56 5.24
AIC 358.26 429.30 339.97
BIC 365.23 437.54 346.58
 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors (S.E.). VIF 
stands for variance inflation for the independent factors. Briefly, if the value of the mean VIF is 
lower than 10, then the models are less likely to be affected by the multi-collinearity problem.
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Table A2: Effect of land and policy reform on rice production in Vietnam (Dependent variable = rice 
production (million tons))
Variables Model A4 Model A5 Model A6
LLI 5.461***(1.202)
5.600***
(1.15)
5.38***
(1.16)
RLL 5.264***(1.544)
6.001***
(1.600)
5.252***
(1.54)
Thai production (million 
tons)
0.630
(0.604)
0.242
(0.521)
0.725
(0.593)
Nraagri -1.227(4.550)
Nranonagri -0.779(4.963)
Nrarice -0.017(0.037)
Liberty -3.042**(1.393)
-2.824**
(0.958)
-2.66*
(1.47)
Doimoi 3.513**(1.460)
3.542**
(1.62)
3.19*
(1.626)
Constant 33.83**(10.957)
34.32***
(8.48)
31.002**
(11.427)
N 20 24 19
Standard Error of 
Regression 1.728 1.73 1.732
Adjusted R2 0.939 0.950 0.935
F-Statistics 50.14*** 73.97*** 44.38***
Durbin-Watson 2.00 1.98 2.05
LM (χ2(1)) 1.504 3.007* 1.41
RESET 0.53 0.68 0.39
White (χ2(1)) 0.14 0.26 0.21
VIF 3.57 4.12 3.08
AIC 84.03 100.18 80.06
BIC 91.00 108.42 86.68
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors (S.E.). VIF 
stands for variance inflation for the independent factors. Briefly, if the value of the mean VIF is 
lower than 10, then the models are less likely to be affected by the multi-collinearity problem.
